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legal and legislative issues

An Update on Student
Equal Access
By Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D.

Education leaders
must be cautious
about how they treat
student-organized
groups on campus.
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I

n Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens (1990), the
Supreme Court upheld the Equal Access
Act (EAA), a federal law enacted to permit student-organized groups to meet during
noninstructional time.
The EAA traces its origins to Widmar v.
Vincent (1981). At issue in Widmar was a
policy whereby ofﬁcials at a state university
in Missouri made campus facilities generally available to student groups for their
activities. Treating religion as a form of
free speech, the Supreme Court ruled that
insofar as ofﬁcials allowed more than 100
student groups to use campus facilities, they
created a forum for the exchange of ideas
and could not bar a club because of the religious content of its speech.
Spurred in part by Widmar, Congress
passed the EAA and President Ronald Reagan
signed it into law on August 11, 1984. The
act clearly states, “It shall be unlawful for
any public secondary school which . . . has a
limited open forum to deny equal access or a
fair opportunity to, or discriminate against,
any students who wish to conduct a meeting . . . on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech
at such meetings” (20 U.S.C. § 4071[a]).
In addition, the EAA speciﬁes that “[a]
public secondary school has a limited open
forum whenever such school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet
on school premises during noninstructional
time” (20 U.S.C. § 4071[b]).
The EAA does set limits. Schools are
deemed to offer an opportunity for students
to conduct a meeting within its limited open
forum if the school provides that—
1. The meeting is voluntary and
student-initiated.
2. There is no sponsorship of the meeting
by the school, the government, or its
agents or employees.

3. Employees or agents of the school or
government are present at religious meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity.
4. The meeting does not materially and
substantially interfere with the orderly
conduct of educational activities within
the school.
5. Nonschool persons may not direct,
conduct, control, or regularly attend
activities of student groups. 20 U.S.C.
§ 4071(c)
Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens
High school students in Nebraska sued their
board for refusing to permit them to organize
a Christian club under the EAA. After the
federal trial court upheld the board’s action,
the Eighth Circuit (1989) reversed in favor of
the students. The court found that the presence of more than 30 noncurriculum-related
clubs at the school—including the band,
chess club, cheerleaders, choir, future medical assistants, Latin and math clubs, student
publications, athletics, and the National
Honor Society—meant that the board created a limited open forum such that the religion club had to be allowed to form.
On appeal to the Supreme Court in Mergens, following a review of the EAA’s history, the Court deferred to congressional
ability to enact such a law. However, as to
the establishment clause question, the Court
lacked a clear majority of ﬁve justices and
could not agree on whether the EAA was
constitutional.
A majority of the Supreme Court agreed
that Congress had the authority to extend
the reasoning of Widmar to eliminate discrimination against religious speech in public
secondary schools. As such, it explained that
a “noncurriculum related student group”
is “best interpreted broadly to mean any
student group that does not directly relate
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to the body of courses offered by the
school” (p. 239), thereby making it
easier for EAA clubs to form.
Turning to the establishment
clause question, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, who wrote the majority opinion, reasoned that in Widmar, the Supreme Court upheld
the principle of equal access under
the Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) test
that the Court applies in most cases
involving religion:
1. The statute must not result in an
“excessive government entanglement” with religious affairs.
2. The statute must not advance nor
inhibit religious practice.
3. The statute must have a secular
legislative purpose.
Justice O’Connor rejected the
board’s argument that the EAA had
the primary effect of advancing religion, because high school students
can distinguish between ofﬁcials’
permitting and ofﬁcials’ endorsing
a club on campus. She observed
that because the prayer club was
only one of a variety of clearly
student-initiated voluntary organizations, students would have been
unlikely to perceive it as an ofﬁcial
endorsement.
Justice O’Connor also rejected
the board’s argument that the club’s
presence resulted in excessive government entanglement, observing
that although the EAA allows education ofﬁcials to assign supervisory
personnel to oversee student behavior, it forbids monitoring, participation, or involvement by faculty or
nonschool personnel, concluding
that the EAA also prohibits school
sponsorship of clubs.
Because only four justices agreed
that the EAA passed establishment
clause analysis, the Supreme Court
left the door open to more litigation
over its status.
Subsequent Developments
Religious groups. In a dispute

from New York, the Second Circuit
allowed students to create a policy
establishing religious standards for
34

its top three ofﬁcers (Hsu v. Roslyn
Union Free School District 1996a,
1996b).
The Ninth Circuit allowed a religious club in California to meet during lunchtime (Ceniceros v. Board
of Trustees of the San Diego Uniﬁed
School District 1997), because it
considered that noninstructional
time; it also granted a Bible club at
a high school in Washington State
access to public funding, school
supplies, school vehicles, and audiovisual equipment (Prince v. Jacoby
2002, 2003).
On the other hand, a federal trial
court in Mississippi rejected the claim
that a board created a limited open
forum designed to permit members
of a religious club to make announcements involving prayers and Bible
readings before classes on a school’s
public address system (Herdahl v.
Pontotoc County School District
1996). The court did permit voluntary student prayer before school.
The Ninth Circuit initially upheld
a school board in California’s refusal
to recognize a club because of its
proposal to require voting members
to express their faith in the Bible
and in Jesus Christ, because ofﬁcials
feared that was a violation of its
nondiscrimination policies (Truth v.
Kent School District 2007). However, an en banc panel reversed in
favor of the club, because a question
remained about whether educators refused to grant the club the
exemption because of its Christian
character or the religious content of
its speech (Truth v. Kent School District 2008).
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) clubs. Unantici-

pated applications of the EAA arose
when students who are LGBT and
their supporters sought to form
clubs. Those groups relied on language in the act that forbids boards
from discriminating “on the basis
of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the
speech at such meetings” (20 U.S.C.
§ 4071[a)].
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The Eighth Circuit, in a case from
Minnesota (Straights and Gays for
Equality v. Osseo Area Schools–District No. 279 2008) agreed that education ofﬁcials could not deny LGBT
clubs the opportunity to use school
facilities.
Three federal trial courts disagreed. When a board in Colorado
limited clubs to those that are curriculum related, the court refused
to disturb the judgment of school
ofﬁcials (Palmer High School Gay/
Straight Alliance v. Colorado
Springs School District No. 11
2005). A court in Texas deferred
to educators because of their concerns about sexually explicit content
accessible from the group’s Website
(Caudillo v. Lubbock Independent School District 2004). More
recently, a federal trial court in
Florida refused to extend the EAA
to a middle school (Carver Middle
School Gay-Straight Alliance v.
School Board of Lake County, Fla.
2014), because it applies only to secondary, not middle, schools.
Postscript
The status of the EAA may be
in doubt in light of the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez (CLS 2010).
CLS examined whether Christian
law students at a public law school
in California could apply membership and leadership requirements to
individuals who wished to join their
organization.
A divided Supreme Court afﬁrmed
that law school ofﬁcials could
require all on-campus groups to
admit everyone from the student
body, even for leadership position,
regardless of whether they agree
with organizational beliefs. Even
though a related issue was unresolved in Truth, a case predating
CLS, it remains to be seen how that
might affect EAA clubs.
Reﬂections
It is important to recall why Congress enacted the EAA: to ensure that
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students could have their own voices
in schools where boards and education ofﬁcials allowed other groups to
meet during noninstructional time.
Some educators fear that allowing
religious and LGBT clubs to meet in
schools may be interpreted as supporting student views about religion
or sexuality, possibly in violation of
the establishment clause. Accordingly, it is worth reviewing the safeguards included in the EAA to help
allay such concerns.
1. Student participation must be
voluntary, thereby avoiding any
concern about ofﬁcial coercion or
endorsement.
2. Educators may not serve as
moderators or sponsors, thereby
avoiding establishment clause
concerns.
3. Educators can be present in
nonparticipating capacities,
essentially to supervise, but they
cannot be present on a regular
basis. As such, the occasional
presence of educators is unlikely
to raise legitimate establishment
clause concerns or to increase
costs, because they are responsible for student safety, regardless
of what pupils are doing during
the school day.
4. Education leaders can prevent
clubs from forming if they “materially and substantially” (20
U.S.C. § 4071[c][4]) interfere
with school activities. Even so,
this section cannot be used to
deny clubs the opportunity to
form absent evidence that their
members are likely to be disruptive, even if the content of their
speech may not be popular in
their communities.
An important, yet unresolved,
question remains about the status
of these clubs in light of Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez. There
can be little doubt that board policies should allow membership to be
open to all who wish to join student
clubs. Less clear, though, is whether
clubs should be required to permit
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students who do not share their values to become leaders, or whether
groups can develop their own criteria so as to preserve their identity
and missions.
Although the Supreme Court
brushed aside such concerns when the
students raised them in CLS, this issue
is worthy of consideration. Further, to
the extent that the EAA allows opposing groups to establish their own
organizations, policies should consider granting clubs the freedom to
apply reasonable membership requirements, especially if they are grounded
in long-held sincere religious or other
beliefs or values.
Policy Recommendations
As school business ofﬁcials work
with their boards and other education leaders to develop policies regulating student clubs, they should be
mindful of the explicit terms of the
EAA discussed earlier. Even so, two
key questions emerge.
First, policies should address the
nature of the clubs. In other words,
policies should state whether clubs
can be organized for socialization
or extracurricular purposes, or if
they must be curriculum related. If
the clubs are not curriculum related,
then boards probably do not have to
recognize them, provide funding, or
grant them access to facilities during
noninstructional time. However, this
approach runs the risk of shortchanging students, because they can beneﬁt
greatly from participating in clubs.
Second, if policies do allow those
clubs to form, they need to specify
whether they grant organizations
exceptions from district antidiscrimination rules so that founders can set
reasonable criteria for candidates
seeking leadership positions. Again,
as discussed above, if clubs are going
to be able to form, it seems to make
sense to allow their organizers to
create fair standards designed to
permit them to preserve group goals,
because students who disagree are

free to form their own clubs taking
on different perspectives.
In keeping with the American
ideal of free speech, school boards
have the duty to devise policies that
ensure access for all student groups.
The trick, of course, is to enact policies that walk the ﬁne line between
maintaining safe and orderly learning environments while protecting
the rights of all students.
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